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Abstract 
This thesis employs total return indices to investigate if catastrophe bonds are zero-beta assets and 
how they have performed compared to other assets. We conduct time series regressions and 
conclude that catastrophe bond returns are correlated with both the return of the equity- and the 
high yield corporate bond market during the subprime financial crisis, but find no significant 
correlation after the crisis. We include a proxy for risk aversion and find that investors’ level of risk 
aversion affects the correlation during the crisis, something that previous researchers have 
discussed theoretically but not shown statistically. Using Sharpe ratios, we examine the risk-
adjusted return of catastrophe bonds and show that catastrophe bonds noticeably out-performed 
the equities and the high yield corporate bonds, both during and after the crisis. The high risk-
adjusted return, in combination with the low correlation with the other financial markets, make 
catastrophe bonds an attractive asset to investors. 
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1. Introduction  
1.1 Background  
The event of a natural disaster causes huge losses both for the people affected and for the insurance 
companies involved. To enable insurance companies to protect themselves from such losses, 
reinsurance companies play an important role in the insurance business. During the 1990s, fueled 
by the devastation of Hurricane Andrew in Florida, a market for insurance-linked securities (ILS) 
started to develop in addition to traditional reinsurance, and this market has thrived since (Kish, 
2016).  
 
Catastrophe bonds (Cat bonds) have been the most successful in terms of volume traded 
(Cummins & Weiss, 2009). The first Cat bond was issued by Hannover Re, today Swiss Reinsurance 
Company (Swiss Re), in 1994. An initial definition of a Cat bond can be quoted from Kish (2016) 
as “..a debt obligation in which the interest (coupon payments) and the return of principal are tied to the payoff 
requirements of an insurance company.” (Kish, 2016). When insurance claims increase due to a 
catastrophic event, the coupons and principal to the investor of a Cat bond covering such an event 
will be lost fully or to some extent.  In short, Cat bonds offer to transfer the risk of natural and 
man-made disasters from insurance companies to investors in the capital market.   
 
An important feature of Cat bonds mentioned in the literature (e.g. Bantwal & Kunreuther (2000), 
Cummins & Weiss (2009) and Kish (2016)) is that these bonds have zero to very low correlation 
with other investments such as stocks or corporate bonds. The low correlation (i.e. beta) increases 
the attractiveness of Cat bonds in portfolio diversification.  
 
The state of the economy has no influence on the occurrence of natural disasters. Reversely, a 
study by Wang & Kutan (2013) show that natural disasters do not seem to significantly affect stock 
market returns. In a rational perspective this would suggest that premiums of Cat bonds should be 
uncorrelated with returns of other investments within the capital market and fit under the 
description zero-beta assets. If we instead assume that investors are not entirely rational, there 
might be reasons to believe that Cat bonds are correlated with the market. Since Cat bonds are 
considered high risk instruments, risk aversion as well as loss aversion of the investors might play 
an important role in the decision whether to include Cat bonds in a portfolio; such psychological 
factors can in turn be dependent of the economic cycle and create a link between Cat bonds and 
other asset classes that initially seem counterintuitive. 
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1.2 Literature review 
Previous research on Cat bonds has been conducted during the late 20th century and early 21st 
century and primarily focuses on the supply side of the bonds (i.e. from the insurance companies’ 
viewpoint). From an investor’s perspective, as this thesis concerns, Bantwal & Kunreuther (2000) 
provide early work in which they try to explain why Cat bond premiums are higher than traditional 
financial theory predicts. By studying investors’ behavior they conclude that premiums are high not 
only because of risk aversion but also because of loss aversion, ambiguity aversion and initial fixed 
costs of education. They propose simulations and standardization within the Cat bond market for 
it to fully develop. Similar to the purpose of Bantwal & Kunreuther’s work, Barrieu & Loubergé 
(2009) aim to explain why the global Cat bond market is so small. 
 
Cummins and Weiss (2009) put insurance linked securities (ILS), such as Cat bonds, in a historical 
context and provide an explanation of the specifics of such instruments. They test the correlation 
between Cat bonds and other asset classes over the period 2002 to 2008 and conclude that the 
correlation is almost zero over the years before the crisis and significantly different from zero 
during the subprime crisis. Further research within this field was conducted by Gürtler, Hibbeln & 
Winkelvos (2016), who studied the effect of financial crisis and natural disasters on Cat bond 
premiums and established that under such circumstances there is a positive relationship between 
Cat bond- and U.S. corporate bond premiums. 
 
Wattman & Feig (2008) provide information about how the credit market has influenced the Cat 
bond market after 2007. Another more recent article, written from an investor’s point of view, is 
that of Kish (2016), who starts off by identifying the risks of investing in the Cat bond market and 
continues by comparing returns from Cat bonds to those of corporate bonds. Kish concludes that 
the returns generated by Cat bonds offsets the risk of the investment. Similar to what Cummins 
and Weiss (2009) claim, he states that diversification is a beneficial feature of Cat bonds. 
 
As stated above, the hypothesis of Cat bonds being zero-beta assets has in previous literature been 
rejected in a period of financial crisis but supported under non-crisis conditions by Cummins and 
Weiss (2009) who test the hypothesis under non-crisis conditions over the period 2002-2007. 
During their period of focus, the Cat bond market was in an early stage and the subprime crisis 
that followed has since then shaped the market (Wattman & Fieg, 2008). Additionally, the number  
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of outstanding securities on the ILS market has increased substantially since 2002 and peaked as 
late as 2016 (ARTEMIS, 2017). There is a lack of research that focuses on testing the correlation 
between Cat bonds and other securities in the conditions of the post-crisis era, which is one of the 
contributions of this thesis. 
 
1.3 Aim and hypotheses 
The aim of this thesis is to investigate the value of Cat bonds to investors. When evaluating an 
investment, the return is weighed against the risk of the investment. Two main risks are usually 
considered: the systematic and idiosyncratic risk. The systematic risk is often referred to as the 
market risk, measured by the beta of an asset. Cat bonds are presented as an instrument with little 
or no correlation with the market (zero or low beta), though this hypothesis has been disproven 
during the financial crisis and has not been tested after the crisis. If the statement that Cat bonds 
are zero- or low-beta instruments can be strengthened further by investigating this correlation not 
only during the subprime crisis but also after the crisis, this would suggest that Cat bonds can offer 
a relevant source of diversification to investors. The main focus of this thesis is therefore to 
examine the systematic risk and answer the question if Cat bonds are zero-beta assets. The second 
question we research is if Cat bonds have outperformed the equity- and the high yield corporate 
bond market seen to risk-adjusted returns; thereby taking into account the idiosyncratic risk (asset-
specific risk). To achieve the aim described we test the following four hypotheses. 
 
Correlation null hypotheses: 
H1: Cat bond returns are not correlated with stock market returns.  
H2: Cat bond returns are not correlated with corporate bond market returns. 
 
Risk-adjusted return null hypotheses: 
H3: The risk-adjusted return in the Cat bond market is lower or equal to the return in the stock market. 
H4: The risk-adjusted return in the Cat bond market is lower or equal to the return in the corporate bond market. 
 
We investigate these hypotheses during a time of both the subprime crisis 2007-2009 and post-
crisis market conditions 2010-2017, whereas a lot of previous researchers, as mentioned above, 
have focused only on the crisis and the pre-crisis period. Another contribution of this thesis is that 
we include a proxy for risk aversion in the regression when testing the correlation hypotheses. By 
this we aim to explain if changes in risk appetite might affect the correlation in different periods.  
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1.4 Structure and delimitations   
The second section of this thesis covers the theoretical framework including the structure of Cat 
bonds, an explanatory part of how Cat bonds are priced and traded and how the market has 
developed over the years of 2009 to 2016. After the theoretical section an empirical study follows 
where the method is described and secondary data is used to test the hypotheses. The results are 
presented in section four. In section five we analyze the results, in section six we propose future 
research topics and in section seven we discuss the robustness of the method. Lastly, in section 8, 
we state our conclusions. 
 
The scope of the study is limited to the comparison of Cat bonds with two other asset classes: 
stocks and high yield corporate bonds. We use the empirical study to test the hypotheses in a global 
perspective by using proxies that is presumed to reflect the global market, even though the majority 
of the Cat bonds represented in the global index is issued in the U.S. The time period of interest is 
2007 to 2017. The period is divided into two parts, where the first part covers the crisis and the 
second part covers the post-crisis conditions of the market. 
 
A risk connected to Cat bonds that is often discussed in the literature is liquidity risk, which would 
be an interesting aspect to study in the post-crisis period because of the rising trading volumes in 
the Cat bond market. In the empirical study, we use an index as a proxy for the Cat bond market 
and do not have information about the volumes traded for each individual bond within the index, 
therefore an analysis of liquidity risks is outside the scope of this thesis.  
 
2. Theoretical Framework 
2.1 Introduction to catastrophe bonds 
The payments (i.e. coupons and principal) of a Cat bond are tied to specific events called triggers, 
which are specified in the bond indenture. (Cummins, 2008) In case of a triggering event some or 
all of the payments to the investor are lost. The triggers differ between different bonds and are 
typically one of the five types: parametric, modeled loss, industry loss index, indemnity and hybrid. 
For parametric triggers the bond is triggered if an objective parameter is met, such as wind-speed 
of a hurricane. Modeled loss, industry loss index and indemnity triggers are connected to modeled 
expected losses of the event, actual industry losses and actual insurance company losses 
respectively. Hybrid refers to a combination of the above mentioned triggers. (FINRA, 2013) In 
2012 the most common triggers were industry loss index (40 %) and indemnity (37 %). (Swiss Re, 
2012) 
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Cat bonds are typically set up by initially forming a single purpose reinsurer (SPR). The SPR issues 
the bond and the proceeds are invested in safe investments such as government bonds or AAA 
rated corporate bonds in a trust account. The fixed returns in the trust account are usually swapped 
for floating returns to reduce interest rate risk. The funds in the trust will be released to the 
insurance company in case the bond is triggered, helping the insurer to pay claims arising from the 
catastrophic event. In most Cat bonds the principal will be fully lost in case of a triggering event, 
but some Cat bond issues have included principal protected tranches where the principal is 
guaranteed and the only returns affected by the triggering event are the coupon payments. 
(Cummins, 2008)  
 
2.2 Pricing and trading of catastrophe bonds 
The vast majority of the Cat bonds outstanding are priced with a spread (premium) over a three 
month floating interest rate such as EURIBOR, LIBOR or U.S Treasury bills, where the U.S 
Treasury bill is the most commonly used. (Kish, 2016) Like other bonds, the yield to maturity of a 
Cat bond is the return from buying a bond, holding it until maturity and receiving the principal, 
assuming you can reinvest any coupon payments at the same rate. The yield has an inverse 
relationship with the price of the bond, meaning that lower price equals higher yield. (Berk & 
DeMarzo, 2011, p. 219) According to neo-classic economic theory, investors are assumed to be 
rational. In a Cat bond pricing perspective this rational behavior means that the yield is determined 
by two factors: the underlying risk-free rate and the investors’ required return for bearing the risk 
of default, which is determined by the risk of the occurrence of a natural disaster and the investors’ 
risk aversion. 
 
In the evolutionary state of Cat bonds, many researchers were puzzled by the high premiums since 
capital market theory suggest that zero-beta assets should be priced similar to risk-free rates. 
(Cummins & Weiss, 2009) Early research (e.g. Bantwal & Kunreuther, 2000, and Froot, 2001) give 
market imperfections, market power of reinsurance companies and behavioral economic aspects 
as possible explanations to why this fails. Since then, as the market has evolved spreads have 
declined, but Cummins & Weiss (2009) state that Cat bond yields are still unlikely to converge to 
the risk-free rate. Kish (2016) introduces several aspects of risk associated with investing in Cat 
bonds that help understand the high premiums that investors demand. Besides the tail risk – a 
small possibility of a huge loss – there is a lack of liquidity in the Cat bond market. There are also 
modeling risks since there are no perfect models to simulate events and counterparty risk since the 
associated insurance firm can go into financial distress. (Kish, 2016) 
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Cat bonds are normally issued under SEC 144A regulations which means that only qualified 
institutional buyers (QIBs) are allowed to buy these securities within the first year. Most Cat bonds 
have two- to five year maturities and after the first year they can be traded in the secondary market. 
(Kish, 2016) 
 
2.3 Catastrophe bond market development after the subprime crisis 
One major development in the total Cat bond and ILS market after the subprime crisis is that the 
volume of outstanding securities has continued to increase substantially. The volume outstanding 
in 2009 and 2017 was $ 13 905 million and $ 25 752 million respectively, with a peak in 2016 of $ 
26 820 million. (ARTEMIS, 2017) Even shortly after the crisis, in late 2008, the pricing, stability 
and volumes traded of Cat bonds compared to other debt instruments indicated that investors were 
not put off by the crisis, but instead found value in the ILS asset class. (Wattman & Feig, 2008) 
 
The crisis revealed some possible drawbacks in the structure of Cat bonds. For instance, some 
SPRs had Lehman Brothers, which became bankrupt in 2008, as their interest rate swap 
counterparty. This called for increased transparency and restrictions in the Cat bond market. 
(Cummins & Weiss, 2009) The structure of Cat bonds has since then been refined. Most of the 
Cat bonds are now rated by one or more rating agency, where the rating is based on risk modeling 
and losses connected to the specific catastrophe. In addition to this improvement, the focus after 
the crisis has been to reduce the exogenous risks, such as the above mentioned swap counterparty 
risk but also risks connected to the trust account held by the SPR. The swap counterparty was 
earlier obligated to make a whole for potential losses only at maturity, these obligations have been 
harshened and the counterparty now has to maintain market value of their investments at all times. 
The different asset classes that are permitted as a collateral for the issuing SPR is reduced, for 
example CDOs (collateralized debt obligations) are no longer allowed. (Wattman & Feig, 2008) In 
conclusion, the market has grown both bigger and more mature since the financial crisis.  
 
In addition to changes in the Cat bond market after the subprime crisis, the overall capital market 
has also had some abnormal features in this period. The low interest rate environment where 
several risk-free rates show values below zero is specifically interesting. This could lead investors 
to search for higher yields from riskier securities, consequently pushing risk premiums down. 
However, according to a trend observed by Bloomberg in July 2016 investors in the low interest 
rate environment chose to hold assets with longer maturity, thereby exposing themselves to a 
higher duration risk instead of trying to reduce the interest rate risk by investing in short term assets 
with a higher credit risk. (Alloway, 2016)  
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3. Method 
3.1 Data 
The total sample we use consists of 534 observations of weekly returns from January 2007 until 
March 2017 of the Swiss Re Global Cat Bond Total Return Index (denoted CAT), the S&P 500 
Index (denoted SPX) and the BofA Merrill Lynch US High Yield BB Effective Yield Index 
(denoted CorpBond). Weekly data is used since Swiss Re publishes the Cat bond index price data 
on a weekly basis. The data is divided into two periods: one during the subprime crisis and one 
after the crisis. The period of the subprime crisis is here defined as 2007.01.01 to 2009.12.31, with 
155 observations. The subsequent period is what we refer to as the post-crisis period, from 
2010.01.01 to 2017.03.30 with 379 observations. There are 30 missing values during the total period 
in the variable CorpBond, nine (9) in crisis (table 1) and 21 in post-crisis (table 2). This leaves us 
with a total of 504 observations, 146 in crisis and 358 in post-crisis. 
 
Table 1. 
Missing values in crisis sample. 
This table lists the missing and total number of observation in the sample from 2007.01.01-2009.12.31, defined 
as the period of crisis.  
VARIABLES Missing Total Percent Missing 
CAT 0 155 0.00 % 
SPX 0 155 0.00 % 
CorpBond 9 155 5.81 % 
 
Table 2. 
Missing values in post-crisis sample. 
This table lists the missing and total number of observation in the sample from 2010.01.01-2017.03.31, defined 
as the post-crisis period.  
VARIABLES Missing Total Percent Missing 
CAT 0 379 0.00 % 
SPX 0 379 0.00 % 
CorpBond 21 379 5.54 % 
 
 
Swiss Re has constructed several indices based on five different portfolios: Global, Global 
Unhedged, USD Cat Bonds, BB Cat Bonds and US Wind Cat Bonds. Since there is no public 
exchange market for Cat bonds, the indices are estimated using indicative secondary market 
information. Previous researchers, e.g. Cummin & Weiss, have used Swiss Re indices as a 
benchmark for the Cat bond market. For this study, the Swiss Re Global Cat Bond Total Return 
Index (Bloomberg ticker: SRGLTRR) is used as a proxy for the global Cat bond market. The index 
tracks the performance of all Cat bonds, denominated in all currencies, issued under Rule 144A. 
The index is not subject to forex risk due to currency hedging and all the bonds of the index that  
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are non-USD denominated bonds are converted into USD at the bond’s settlement day. (Swiss Re, 
2014) This index is chosen to capture a globally diversified portfolio of Cat bonds while avoiding 
the influence of foreign exchange risk.  
 
As a proxy for the equity market, the S&P 500 is used, which is a total return index of the 500 
biggest listed companies in the U.S. The S&P 500 is chosen because the biggest part of the Cat 
bond issues is denominated in U.S. dollars (Kish, 2016) and it is also assumed to be a useful index 
in a global perspective considering the multinational reach of the companies within it.   
 
The corporate bond market is represented by the BofA Merrill Lynch US High Yield BB Effective 
Yield Index. This is an effective yield index, which takes compounding effect into account by re-
investing interest payments, and is therefore comparable to the other total return indices used. The 
index tracks the performance of USD denominated below investment grade corporate bonds 
(equivalent to BB or lower), rated by Moody's, S&P and Fitch. Cat bonds are usually rated BB, B 
or CCC (Kish, 2016) which is why an index of high yielding bonds is suitable. Analogously with 
the S&P 500, we find a USD denominated corporate bond index appropriate because the majority 
of the Cat bonds are issued in the U.S.  
 
3.2 Control variables  
We use time series (TS) regressions to test the correlation between Cat bonds and the two other 
asset classes: stocks and bonds. Control variables are included to account for possible endogeneity 
problems.  
 
3.2.1 Time and seasonal trends 
We usually do not expect there to be a time trend when observing returns, but previous research 
of Cummins & Weiss (2009) has shown that Cat bond returns have decreased over time and 
therefore we suspect a negative time trend in the data. When testing each period individually the 
models are not significant, therefore, we test for a time trend in the total period of 2007 to early 
2017 to detect possible time trends.  
 
We test the hypothesis: 
𝐶𝐴𝑇 = ∝0+∝1 𝑡 + 𝑈𝑡  
𝐻0 : ∝1 = 0 
𝐻𝐴 : ∝1 ≠ 0 
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The results in table 3 allow us to reject the null and show a significant and slightly negative time 
trend. To adjust for this time trend we include a time variable in the regression model even though 
the coefficient in the regression is very low.  
 
Table 3. 
Time trend. 
This table presents the test of a time trend in the total period of 2007.01.01-2017.03.31. Where CAT is the weekly 
return in the Swiss Re Global Cat Bond TR Index and t is a weekly time variable. 
VARIABLES CAT 
  
 
t -1.90e-04**  
(8.25e-05) 
Constant 0.203***  
(0.029)   
Observations 534 
R-squared 0.009 
Prob > F 0.022** 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
There might also be seasonal trends in Cat bond returns. According to ARTEMIS, a news, analysis 
and data portal of alternative investments, there is a seasonal price change in Cat bonds due to 
weather patterns such as windstorm- and hurricane seasons (ARTEMIS, 2012). This pattern could 
also be reflected in Cat bond returns. Similar to the time trend regression, we use the total time 
period in order to get enough observations.  
 
We test the hypothesis: 
𝐶𝐴𝑇 =  ß0 + ß1𝑄1𝑡 + ß2𝑄2𝑡 + ß3𝑄3𝑡 + 𝑈𝑡  
𝐻0 :  ß1 = ß2 = ß3 = 0 
𝐻𝐴 :  𝐴𝑡 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑜𝑓 ß1, ß2 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ß3 ≠ 0 
 
Where Q1, Q2 and Q3 are quarterly dummies that take the value 1 if the observation is in the 
quarter represented and 0 otherwise. The fourth quarter (Q4) is the reference. We conduct an F-
test of joint significance and get a p-value of 0.000. This allows us to reject the null at a 1% level 
and we conclude that there is a significant seasonal trend. To account for this pattern, we include 
seasonal dummies Q1, Q2 and Q3 as control variables in the regression of Cat bond returns.  
 
3.2.2 Risk-free interest rate 
The interest rates of Cat bonds are based on the risk-free rate, usually on the three-month Treasury 
bill, LIBOR or EURIBOR rate (Kish, 2016). The risk-free rate also affects the return of corporate 
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bonds and equity, since investors are assumed to be risk averse and demand a risk premium above 
the risk-free rate when investing in risky assets (Reilly & Brown, 2012, p. 182). Hence, we find it 
suitable to control for the risk-free rate in the regression and the BofA Merrill Lynch 3-Month U.S. 
Treasury Bill Index is used to proxy the 3-month U.S. Treasury Bill rate.  
 
3.2.3 Risk aversion 
Portfolio theory predicts that investors are risk averse, and the expectation is that there is a positive 
relationship between risk and return. (Reilly & Brown, 2012, p. 182). Changes in attitude towards 
risk are therefore assumed to affect both returns in the Cat bond-, the stock- and the corporate 
bond market, giving rise to a possible endogeneity problem. To adjust for this, we include a control 
variable for risk aversion in the model. There are several indices to measure attitudes towards risk 
in the market. These indices are commonly based on portfolio theory where the level of risk 
aversion is estimated by looking at the excess return demanded by investors when taking on 
additional risk.  
 
In the empirical analysis we use BofA Merrill Lynch Global Financial Stress Index with focus on 
risk appetite (Bloomberg ticker: GFSIRISK) as a proxy for the level of risk aversion. This index is 
used because it is presented on a daily basis and uses data across different markets: global credit, 
equity, interest rates, forex and commodity. The index contains both transactions on public 
exchanges as well as OTC-transactions. (Reuters, 2010) Our expectation is that the level of risk 
aversion is higher during periods following financial distress and by observing the index 
fluctuations visually in graph 1 we see that it follows our expected pattern. 
 
Graph 1. 
BofA ML GFSI Risk Index 2007.01.01-2017.03.31. 
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3.3 Serial correlation and heteroscedasticity 
To see that the estimates are unbiased and that the standard errors are correct we test the properties 
for TS regression in a large sample. First, we test for serial correlation in the dependent variable in 
both periods separately by observing the correlation between CATt and CATt−1. We find that the 
variable is weakly dependent (ρ = 0.17).  
 
Then we test for serial correlation in the error term by predicting the error term U and testing the 
hypothesis: 
 
?̂?𝑡 =  𝜌?̂?𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡   
𝐻0: 𝜌 = 0 
𝐻𝐴: 𝜌 ≠ 0 
 
We run the regression and find no significant evidence for serial correlated errors in either of the 
samples.  
 
Testing for heteroscedasticity in each period separately we get no significance in the models (F-
value>0.05), therefore we test for this in the total period of 2007.01.01-2017.03.31. We test the 
hypothesis: 
 
?̂?𝑡
2 = 𝜗0 + 𝜗1𝐶𝐴𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡   
𝐻0: 𝜗1 = 0 
𝐻𝐴: 𝜗1 ≠ 0 
 
By running this regression, we find significant evidence for heteroscedasticity, which is adjusted 
for by using robust standard errors in the regression.  We also check for heteroscedasticity in the 
variance to see if we can predict current volatility by looking at volatility in the past by testing the 
hypothesis: 
 
?̂?𝑡
2 = 𝜏0 + 𝜏1?̂?𝑡−1
2 + 𝜏2𝐶𝐴𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡   
𝐻0: 𝜏1 = 0 
𝐻𝐴: 𝜏1 ≠ 0 
 
We find no evidence of heteroscedasticity in the error term. When using robust standard errors, 
we therefore conclude that all properties of the OLS estimator in time series regression hold.  
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3.4 Models  
3.4.1 Correlation 
To test the correlation hypotheses we conduct TS regressions. The statistical software Stata is used 
to run the TS regressions. The models are as following: 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑇 =  𝜑0 + 𝜑1𝑆𝑃𝑋𝑡 + 𝜑2𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑡 + 𝜑3𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 + 𝜑4𝑡 + 𝜑5𝑄1𝑡 + 𝜑6𝑄2𝑡 + 𝜑7𝑄3𝑡 + 𝑈𝑡   
𝐶𝐴𝑇 =  𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑡 + 𝛾3𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 + 𝛾4𝑡 + 𝛾5𝑄1𝑡 + 𝛾6𝑄2𝑡 + 𝛾7𝑄3𝑡 + 𝑈𝑡  
 
Where CAT, SPX, CorpBond and RiskFree are the weekly return in the Swiss Re Global Cat Bond 
Total Return Index, the S&P 500, the BofA Merrill Lynch US High Yield BB Effective Yield Index 
and the BofA Merrill Lynch 3-Month U.S. Treasury Bill Index, respectively. The return is calculated 
as: 
 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑃𝑖,𝑡
𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1
− 1 Where Pi,t is the price of index i in week t 
 
The variable RiskAversion is the BofA Merrill Lynch Global Financial Stress Index. The variable t 
is the time variable and Q1, Q2 and Q3 are the quarterly dummies, all included as control variables 
for time- and seasonal trends.  
 
In the first model, CAT is the dependent variable and SPX is the variable of interest. In the second 
model, CAT is the dependent variable and CorpBond is the variable of interest. We run the models 
and add one control variable at a time. 
 
These models are used to test the following hypotheses: 
 
𝐻1:  𝜑1 = 0  
𝐻𝐴,1:  𝜑1 ≠ 0  
 
𝐻2:  𝛾1 = 0  
𝐻𝐴,2:  𝛾1 ≠ 0  
  
14 
 
3.4.2 Risk-adjusted return 
We use Sharpe ratios to compare the risk-adjusted return across different asset classes. Sharpe ratio 
is an industry standard to measure the “risk premium return earned per extra unit of total risk” (Reilly & 
Brown, 2012, p. 965). In Andrew Lo’s article “The Statistics of Sharpe Ratios” from 2002, he suggests 
two methods to calculate Sharpe ratio estimators and their statistical properties. In the first method 
returns are assumed to be independently and identically distributed (IID). In the second, more 
general method, this assumption is not made. The non-IID method incorporates phenomena such 
as autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity, which are regularly observed in financial time series. 
However, the non-IID method requires mathematics and statistics too advanced for this thesis. 
Therefore, we use Lo’s first method and assume that returns are IID to derive the distribution and 
the test statistic of the Sharpe ratio estimator. The second assumption we make is that there is no 
covariance between the returns of the different indices and therefore no covariance between the 
Sharpe ratio estimators. These assumptions and their potential weaknesses are further discussed in 
the robustness section of the thesis.  
 
The Sharpe ratio (SR) is defined as following: 
𝑆𝑅 =
𝜇 − 𝑅𝑓
𝜎
 
Where 
𝜇 ≡ 𝐸[𝑅𝑡] 𝜎
2 ≡ 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑅𝑡) 𝜎 = √𝜎2 𝑅𝑓  is the risk-free rate 
 
To estimate the population parameters μ and σ we use the sample of historical returns (R1, R2, … 
, RT) and compute the estimators: 
?̂? =
1
𝑇
∑ 𝑅𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1   ?̂? = √
1
𝑇
∑ (𝑅𝑡 − ?̂?)2
𝑇
𝑡=1  
We use μ̂ and σ̂ to compute the Sharpe ratio estimator: 
𝑆?̂? =
?̂? − 𝑅𝑓
?̂?
 
Using a large sample, due to the central limit theorem, the Sharpe ratio can be approximated by: 
𝑆?̂?~𝑁(𝑆𝑅, 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑆?̂?))  
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Under the assumption that returns are IID, Lo (2002) shows that: 
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑆?̂?) =
1 +
1
2 𝑆𝑅
2 
𝑛
 
Where n is the number of observations 
 
The difference of two sample means of normally distributed variables with no covariance has the 
following variance: 
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑆?̂?𝑥 − 𝑆?̂?𝑦) = 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑆?̂?𝑥) + 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑆?̂?𝑦)  which gives: 
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑆?̂?𝑥 − 𝑆?̂?𝑦) =
1 +
1
2 𝑆𝑅𝑥
2
𝑛𝑥
+
1 +
1
2 𝑆𝑅𝑦
2
𝑛𝑦
 
The estimated variance and standard error of the Sharpe ratio estimator is then: 
𝑉𝑎?̂?(𝑆?̂?𝑥 − 𝑆?̂?𝑦) =
1 +
1
2 𝑆?̂?𝑥
2
𝑛𝑥
+
1 +
1
2 𝑆?̂?𝑦
2
𝑛𝑦
 
𝑆?̂?(𝑆?̂?𝑥 − 𝑆?̂?𝑦) =
√
1 +
1
2 𝑆?̂?𝑥
2
𝑛𝑥
+
1 +
1
2 𝑆?̂?𝑦
2
𝑛𝑦
 
The test statistic for SRx − SRy when Var(SRx) and Var(SRx) are unknown and cannot be assumed 
equal is given by: 
𝑡𝑑𝑓 =
(𝑆?̂?𝑥−𝑆?̂?𝑦)−𝑑0
√
1+12𝑆?̂?𝑥
2
𝑛𝑥
+
1+12𝑆?̂?𝑦
2
𝑛𝑦
    𝑑𝑓 =
((1+12𝑆?̂?𝑥
2
) 𝑛𝑥⁄ +(1+
1
2𝑆?̂?𝑦
2
) 𝑛𝑦)⁄
2
((1+12𝑆?̂?𝑥
2
) 𝑛𝑥)⁄
2
(𝑛𝑥−1)⁄  + (1+
1
2𝑆?̂?𝑦
2
) 𝑛𝑦)⁄
2
(𝑛𝑦−1)⁄
 
 
We use excel to manually compute the t-statistic and test the following hypotheses: 
 
𝐻3 :  𝑆𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑇 − 𝑆𝑅𝑆𝑃𝑋 ≤ 0 
𝐻𝐴,3:  𝑆𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑇 − 𝑆𝑅𝑆𝑃𝑋 > 0 
 
𝐻4 :  𝑆𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑇 − 𝑆𝑅𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 ≤ 0 
𝐻𝐴,4:  𝑆𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑇 − 𝑆𝑅𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 > 0 
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3.5 Descriptive statistics 
This section displays descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent variables. Since these 
summary statistic means are arithmetic, i.e. do not take compounding effects into account, they do 
not allow us to draw conclusions about the compounded returns of the three markets but they give 
an indication of the variables’ movement in the two periods. 
 
Table 4.   
Descriptive statistics of the dependent variable, variables of interest and control variables of the crisis sample 
2007.01.01-2009.12.31, where CAT is the weekly return of the Swiss Re Global Cat Bond TR Index, SPX is the weekly 
return of the S&P 500, CorpBond is the weekly return of the BofA ML High Yield Corporate Bond Index, RiskFree is 
the 3-month risk-free rate proxy and RiskAversion is the proxy for risk aversion based on the BofA ML GFSI. 
VARIABLES Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
CAT 0.187 0.355 -2.440 1.339 
SPX -0.079 3.602 -18.195 12.026 
CorpBond 0.075 1.839 -10.862 5.499 
RiskFree 0.047 0.052 -0.070 0.252 
RiskAversion 0.679 1.005 -0.670 3.300 
 
Table 5.  
Descriptive statistics of the dependent variable, variables of interest and control variables of the post-crisis sample 
2010.01.01-2017.03.31, where CAT is the weekly return of the Swiss Re Global Cat Bond TR Index, SPX is the weekly 
return of the S&P 500, CorpBond is the weekly return of the BofA ML High Yield Corporate Bond Index, RiskFree is 
the 3-month risk-free rate proxy and RiskAversion is the proxy for risk aversion based on the BofA ML GFSI.  
VARIABLES Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
CAT 0.137 0.299 -2.463 1.735 
SPX 0.215 1.972 -7.189 7.389 
CorpBond 0.145 0.754 -2.833 3.088 
RiskFree 0.002 0.006 -0.031 0.031 
RiskAversion 0.149 0.371 -0.550 1.370 
 
 
As we see in table 4, Cat bonds had the highest average return during the crisis period and a lower 
standard deviation in this period than both equity and corporate bonds. In the post-crisis period, 
shown in table 5, the equity- and corporate bond indices each have an average return that is higher 
than that of the Cat bond index, but Cat bond returns still show the lowest volatility of the three.  
 
The return of the risk-free rate shows higher volatility during the crisis period than during the post-
crisis period and has a much lower average return after the crisis. This is visualized in graph 2. In 
graph 3 we see that equity- and corporate bond returns show noticeable volatility over the entire 
period. The volatility of the risk aversion index can be seen in graph 1.  
 
 
17 
 
Graph 2. 
Weekly return of the BofA ML 3-Month U.S. Treasury Bill Index, 2007.01.01-2017.03.31. 
 
Graph 3. 
Weekly return of the S&P 500 and the BofA ML US High Yield BB Effective Yield Index, 2007.01.01-2017.03.31. 
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4. Results 
4.1 Correlation during the crisis 
The results found from testing the correlation hypotheses in the crisis period are presented in table 
6 and table 7. The results in table 6 allow us to reject H1 at a 10 % significance level when including 
all control variables. This means we can show a positive correlation between Cat bond and equity 
returns with a coefficient of 0.030. The results also show significance in the RiskAversion variable 
and some explanatory power of a positive time trend. Comparing column (2) with column (3) to 
(5) we find that when adjusting for risk aversion, the explanatory power of SPX on CAT decreases.  
 
Table 6. 
Regression Cat bond- and equity market returns, 2007.01.01-2009.12.31. 
This table presents the test of H1 in the crisis period. CAT is the weekly return in the Swiss Re Global Cat Bond TR 
Index, SPX is the weekly return in the S&P 500, RiskFree is the 3-month risk-free rate proxy and RiskAversion is the 
proxy for risk aversion based on the BofA ML GFSI. The variable t is a weekly time variable and Q1, Q2 and Q3 are 
quarterly dummies. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES CAT CAT CAT CAT CAT 
            
SPX 0.030 0.035* 0.030* 0.030* 0.030* 
 
(0.020) (0.020) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) 
RiskFree 
 
1.233** 0.279 1.412 1.332 
  
(0.580) (0.664) (0.897) (0.945) 
RiskAversion 
  
-0.084** -0.116*** -0.126** 
   
(0.039) (0.044) (0.051) 
t 
   
0.002** 0.003** 
    
(0.001) (0.001) 
Q1 
    
0.090 
     
(0.075) 
Q2 
    
-0.036 
     
(0.053) 
Q3 
    
0.047 
     
(0.089) 
Constant 0.189*** 0.139*** 0.241*** 0.025 -0.009 
 
(0.027) (0.045) (0.052) (0.116) (0.147) 
      
Observations 155 146 146 146 146 
R-squared 0.095 0.134 0.170 0.204 0.220 
Prob > F     0.020** 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7. 
Regression Cat bond- and corporate bond market returns, 2007.01.01-2009.12.31. 
This table presents the test of H2 in the crisis period. CAT is the weekly return in the Swiss Re Global Cat Bond TR 
Index, CorpBond is the weekly return in the BofA ML High Yield Corporate Bond Index, RiskFree is the 3-month 
risk-free rate proxy and RiskAversion is the proxy for risk aversion based on the BofA ML GFSI. The variable t is a 
weekly time variable and Q1, Q2 and Q3 are quarterly dummies. 
  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES CAT CAT CAT CAT CAT 
            
CorpBond 0.088** 0.096** 0.087** 0.084** 0.085** 
 
(0.042) (0.041) (0.038) (0.038) (0.037) 
RiskFree 
 
1.480** 0.749 1.508 1.328 
  
(0.601) (0.747) (0.972) (0.995) 
RiskAversion 
  
-0.063* -0.088*** -0.095** 
   
(0.034) (0.034) (0.039) 
t 
   
0.002* 0.002 
    
(0.001) (0.001) 
Q1 
    
0.007 
     
(0.054) 
Q2 
    
-0.098* 
     
(0.055) 
Q3 
    
0.023 
     
(0.090) 
Constant 0.185*** 0.115** 0.194*** 0.044 0.082 
 
(0.029) (0.047) (0.057) (0.115) (0.132) 
      
Observations 146 146 146 146 146 
R-squared 0.197 0.240 0.260 0.277 0.292 
Prob > F     0.016** 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
   
 
 
The results in table 7 are stronger than the results in the previous regression and allow us to reject 
H2 that Cat bond returns are not correlated with returns at the corporate bond market at a 5% 
significance level. The variable of interest CorpBond has an explanatory power of the dependent 
variable CAT and that the correlation is positive with a coefficient of 0.085. Comparing the results 
in column (7) with column (8) to (10) we find that the explanatory power of corporate bond market 
returns on Cat bond returns decrease when controlling for risk aversion. We also find that there is 
no longer significance in the controlling variable RiskFree when also controlling for risk aversion. 
This is the case when testing both H1 and H2. 
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4.2 Correlation after the crisis 
Table 8 presents the results found from testing H1 that Cat bond returns are not correlated with 
equity returns, in the post-crisis period. As we see in the table there is no significance in the SPX 
variable and therefore we cannot reject the null hypothesis. These results from the post-crisis 
period support the claim that there is no proof of a significant correlation between the Cat bond- 
and the equity market.   
 
Table 8. 
Regression Cat bond- and equity market returns, 2010.01.01-2017.03.31. 
This table presents the test of H1 in the post-crisis period. CAT is the weekly return in the Swiss Re Global Cat Bond 
TR Index, SPX is the weekly return in the S&P 500, RiskFree is the 3-month risk-free rate proxy and RiskAversion is 
the proxy for risk aversion based on the BofA ML GFSI. The variable t is a weekly time variable and Q1, Q2 and Q3 
are quarterly dummies. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES CAT CAT CAT CAT CAT 
            
SPX -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.006  
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) 
RiskFree 
 
-1.148 -1.148 -0.444 -0.335   
(2.331) (2.378) (2.543) (2.606) 
RiskAversion 
  
-1.86e-05 -0.024 -0.031    
(0.043) (0.047) (0.048) 
t 
   
-2.18e-04 -2.29e-04     
(0.000) (0.000) 
Q1 
    
-0.015      
(0.053) 
Q2 
    
-0.014      
(0.051) 
Q3 
    
0.153***      
(0.054) 
Constant 0.139*** 0.142*** 0.142*** 0.191*** 0.161***  
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.044) (0.061)       
Observations 379 358 358 358 358 
R-squared 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.007 0.062 
Prob > F     0.000*** 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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The results in table 9 are those from testing the correlation between Cat bond returns and returns 
in the corporate bond market (H2). Similar to the results we get for the equity market, there is no 
significance in the CorpBond variable in any of the three significance levels. Therefore, we cannot 
reject the null and prove a correlation between returns in the Cat bond market and the corporate 
bond market in the post-crisis period. We find no predictive power of the risk-free rate on Cat 
bond returns in neither of the result tables for the post-crisis period.  
 
Table 9. 
Regression Cat bond- and corporate bond market returns, 2010.01.01-2017.03.31. 
This table presents the test of H2 in the post-crisis period. CAT is the weekly return in the Swiss Re Global Cat Bond 
TR Index, CorpBond is the weekly return in the BofA ML High Yield Corporate Bond Index, RiskFree is the 3-month 
risk-free rate proxy and RiskAversion is the proxy for risk aversion based on the BofA ML GFSI. The variable t is a 
weekly time variable and Q1, Q2 and Q3 are quarterly dummies. 
  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES CAT CAT CAT CAT CAT 
            
CorpBond 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.013 0.019  
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
RiskFree 
 
-0.899 -0.911 -0.226 -0.146   
(2.355) (2.410) (2.562) (2.632) 
RiskAversion 
  
0.003 -0.020 -0.027    
(0.042) (0.046) (0.047) 
t 
   
-2.13e-04 -2.21e-04     
(0.000) (0.000) 
Q1 
    
-0.017      
(0.054) 
Q2 
    
-0.009      
(0.050) 
Q3 
    
0.156***      
(0.053) 
Constant 0.135*** 0.137*** 0.137*** 0.185*** 0.153**  
(0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.045) (0.061)       
Observations 358 358 358 358 358 
R-squared 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.006 0.063 
Prob > F     0.000*** 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
 
 
4.3 Risk-adjusted return 
Sharpe ratios are often annualized when presented, as we do in table 10. This is done to get 
reference points of the three indices. However, one should be vigilant when annualizing Sharpe 
ratios by multiplying with the square root of number of periods in a year, since this can lead to 
erroneous estimates (Lo, 2002). This is why weekly values are used in the subsequent analysis.  
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As shown in table 10, the annualized risk-adjusted return has been higher for Cat bonds than for 
equity and corporate bonds. This is true for all three periods. 
 
Tables 11-13 show the results from conducting difference of means t-test of the Sharpe ratios to 
determine whether risk-adjusted return has been significantly higher in the Cat bond market than 
the markets for the two other asset classes. For the crisis period we get a difference of means in 
weekly risk-adjusted return between CAT and SPX of 0.48 and between CAT and CorpBond of 
0.41. The differences are significant at a 1% level. We reject the null hypotheses H3 and H4 in the 
crisis period and conclude that the risk-adjusted return in the Cat bond market has been higher 
than those of the equity- and corporate bond markets.  
 
Table 10. 
Annualized Sharpe ratio per market. 
This table presents the annualized1 Sharpe ratios for the crisis period 2007.01.01-2009.12.31, post-crisis period 
2010.01.01-2017.03.31 and over the total period (crisis and post-crisis). CAT, SPX and CorpBond are the Sharpe 
ratios based on weekly returns of the Swiss Re Global Cat Bond TR Index, the S&P 500 and the BofA ML High Yield 
Corporate Bond Index, respectively. 
VARIABLES CAT SPX CorpBond 
Crisis 2.875 -0.400 0.110 
Post-crisis 3.183 0.739 1.361 
Total period 3.064 0.236 0.670 
1 The Sharpe ratios have been annualized using weekly Sharpe Ratios × √52  
 
 
Table 11. 
Sharpe ratios difference of means, t-test, 2007.01.01-2009.12.31. 
This table presents the difference of means t-test of Sharpe ratios for the crisis period. μ̂ is the sample mean of 
weekly returns and σ̂ is the standard deviation of weekly returns of the Swiss Re Global Cat Bond TR Index, the 
S&P 500 and the BofA ML High Yield Corporate Bond Index. RiskFree is the 3-month risk-free rate proxy, Var̂(SR̂) 
is the variance of the Sharpe ratio sample mean and SE(̂SR̂) is the standard error of the Sharpe ratio sample mean. 
The variables diff CAT SPX and diff CAT CorpBond are the difference of means.  
      
VARIABLES CAT SPX CorpBond RiskFree diff CAT SPX  diff CAT CorpBond 
# of observations 146 146 146 146 146 146 
?̂? return % 0.191 -0.157 0.075 0.047 
  
?̂? return % 0.362 3.665 1.833 
   
Sharpe ratio 0.399 -0.055 0.015 
 
0.480*** 0.410*** 
𝐕𝐚𝐫(̂𝐒?̂?) 0.007 0.007 0.007 
 
0.009 0.009 
𝐒𝐄(̂𝐒?̂?)         0.095 0.095 
t-statistic 
    
5.057 4.315 
df 
    
290 290 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
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Table 12. 
Sharpe ratios difference of means, t-test, 2010.01.01-2017.03.31. 
This table presents the difference of means t-test of Sharpe ratios for the post-crisis period. μ̂ is the sample mean 
of weekly returns and σ̂ is the standard deviation of weekly returns of the Swiss Re Global Cat Bond TR Index, the 
S&P 500 and the BofA ML High Yield Corporate Bond Index. RiskFree is the 3-month risk-free rate proxy, Var(̂SR̂) is 
the variance of the Sharpe ratio sample mean and SE(̂SR̂) is the standard error of the Sharpe ratio sample mean. 
The variables diff CAT SPX and diff CAT CorpBond are the difference of means.  
      
VARIABLES CAT SPX CorpBond RiskFree diff CAT 
SPX  
diff CAT 
CorpBond 
# of observations 358 358 358 358 358 358 
?̂? return % 0.137 0.204 0.145 0.002 
  
?̂? return % 0.306 1.969 0.753 
   
Sharpe ratio 0.441 0.102 0.189 
 
0.322*** 0.236*** 
𝐕𝐚𝐫(̂𝐒?̂?) 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 
0.005 0.005 
𝐒𝐄(̂𝐒?̂?)         0.071 0.071 
t-statistic 
    
4.573 3.337 
df 
    
713 713 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
 
Table 12 shows the results found from testing the risk-adjusted return hypotheses in the post-crisis 
period. The difference of means in weekly risk-adjusted return between the Cat bond market and 
the equity market is 0.322. For the Cat bond and the corporate bond market the difference is 
somewhat lower, at 0.236. Similar to the crisis period, the results are significant at a 1% level and 
allow us to reject H3 and H4. Thus, risk-adjusted return in the Cat bond market has been higher 
than those of the equity- and corporate bond market in the post-crisis period. 
 
Lastly, we present the results found from testing the entire period from January 2007 until March 
2017 in table 13. We find that the difference in risk-adjusted return in the Cat bond market 
compared to the stock market is 0.322 whereas the difference between the Cat bond- and the 
corporate bond market is 0.236. The results show significantly higher risk-adjusted return in the 
Cat bond market at a 1% level and allow us to reject both H3 and H4. For the entire period we 
conclude that risk-adjusted return has been higher in the Cat bond market compared to the markets 
of the two other asset classes.   
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Table 13. 
Sharpe ratios difference of means, t-test, 2007.01.01-2017-03-31. 
This table presents the difference of means t-test of Sharpe ratios for the total period. μ̂ is the sample mean of 
weekly returns and σ̂ is the standard deviation of weekly returns of the Swiss Re Global Cat Bond TR Index, the 
S&P 500 and the BofA ML High Yield Corporate Bond Index. RiskFree is the 3-month risk-free rate proxy, Var(̂SR̂) 
is the variance of the Sharpe ratio sample mean and SE(̂SR̂) is the standard error of the Sharpe ratio sample mean. 
The variables diff CAT SPX and diff CAT CorpBond are the difference of means.  
      
VARIABLES CAT SPX CorpBond RiskFree diff CAT SPX  diff CAT CorpBond 
# of observations 504 504 504 504 504 504 
μ̂ return % 0.153 0.100 0.124 0.015 
  
σ̂ return % 0.324 2.583 1.173 
   
Sharpe ratio 0.425 0.033 0.093 
 
0.392*** 0.332*** 
Var(̂SR̂) 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 
0.004 0.004 
SE(̂SR̂)         0.064 0.065 
t-statistic 
    
6.090 5.150 
df 
    
1004 1004 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
 
 
5. Analysis 
In this section we analyze each time period separately and look at both correlation and risk-adjusted 
return results to discuss the value of Cat bonds for investors.  
 
5.1 Crisis period 2007-2009 
In line with previous research by Cummins & Weiss (2009) and Gürtler, Hibbeln & Winkelvos 
(2016) we find a significant correlation (beta) between returns in the Cat bond market and the 
equity- as well as the corporate bond market during the crisis period. Even so, the predictive power 
of returns in the equity- or corporate bond market on Cat bond returns is low. When we test the 
correlation with the equity market it generates a beta of approximately 0.03, and when testing 
against the corporate bond market the beta is approximately 0.09. The idea of Cat bonds as zero-
beta assets is proven to be untrue during the crisis, but the low betas still suggest that Cat bonds 
have a very low systematic risk and therefore are beneficial for diversification. 
 
Some of the Cat bonds outstanding during the crisis went into default when Lehman Brothers 
declared bankruptcy in 2008 and Gürtler, Hibbeln & Winkelvos (2016) have proven that the 
bankruptcy had an effect on Cat bond returns. Therefore, we suspect that some of the correlation 
is caused by the default of these bonds due to the swap counterparty and not due to the market 
decline. The restrictions implemented after this event described by Wattman & Fieg (2008) might 
in the case of future crises, generate even lower betas of Cat bonds.  
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When including a proxy for risk aversion in the model the results display lower betas. These 
findings suggest that some of the correlation with the equity- and corporate bond market can be 
explained by changes in attitudes towards risk during a period of crisis. Shown by the risk aversion 
index that we have used as a proxy in the models, investors’ risk aversion increased during the 
crisis. Our expectation is that when the level of risk aversion increases, investors require a higher 
premium for taking on more risk in all parts of the capital market. This would affect returns on the 
equity-, corporate bond- and Cat bond markets negatively and the correlation between the different 
markets increases. These expectations are confirmed by the results and the findings allow us to 
statistically show what previously has been theoretically discussed by Bantwal & Kunreuther (2000) 
about the effect of risk aversion on Cat bond premiums.  
 
The correlation between Cat bond- and corporate bond returns is higher than that of Cat bond- 
and equity returns. This result is not surprising and can be explained by the fact that Cat bonds and 
corporate bonds are both debt instruments, have similar ratings and the investors of the two 
instruments might have similar behavior. Cat bonds are initially issued to QIBs and are traded in 
large denominations, which are features we connect to the debt market rather than the equity 
market.  
 
We would expect the risk-free rate to have relatively high and significant correlation with Cat bond 
returns in the model because Cat bonds are priced above a floating risk-free rate. This is supported 
by our findings before we include a proxy for risk aversion, which, when included, removes the 
significance of the risk-free rate proxy. A possible explanation for this is multicollinearity, since the 
variables for risk-free rate and risk aversion are negatively correlated during the crisis (table 14).  
 
Table 14. 
Correlation matrix, 3-month risk-free rate proxy and risk aversion proxy, 2007.01.01-2009-12-31.  
RiskFree RiskAversion 
RiskFree 1.00 
 
RiskAversion -0.54*** 1.00 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
In addition to the low systematic risk, Cat bonds have outperformed both the equity- and corporate 
bond market, measured by risk-adjusted return during the crisis. The annualized Sharpe ratio for 
Cat bonds in the crisis period is 2.88 compared to -0.40 for equity and 0.11 for high yield corporate 
bonds and the weekly risk-adjusted returns are proven significantly higher for Cat bonds. This 
might be explained by the previous results concerning the correlation; the low beta gives a lower 
effect on Cat bond returns when the market fell during the crisis – the returns stay on a relatively 
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high level and the volatility does not rise to the levels shown in the rest of the market. Our findings 
support the conclusion drawn by Kish (2016) that the risk incurred by investing in Cat bonds might 
to some extent be offset by the high returns.  
 
Thus, for the crisis period we find low systematic risk and higher risk-adjusted returns in 
comparison to the other assets. Consequently, Cat bonds can be presented as valuable securities 
for diversification in a period of crisis and might be even more valuable in case of a future crisis 
because of the lessons learned and improvements made in the Cat bond market since the last one. 
 
5.2 Post-crisis period 2010-2017 
In the post-crisis period we do not get any significant results when testing the correlation 
hypotheses. This means that we cannot find any proof of correlation between Cat bond returns 
and neither stock- nor corporate bond returns. This is in agreement with previous results presented 
by Cummins & Weiss (2009) and Kish (2016) and supports our expectations that Cat bond returns 
are determined by the risk of natural disasters (i.e. their default risk) and not fluctuations in capital 
markets. 
 
The expectation that Cat bonds are zero-beta assets is based on the idea of rational behavior of 
investors. On the contrary, Bantwal & Kunreuther (2000) suggest in their paper that investors are 
not completely rational when it comes to Cat bonds and that different biases affect the premiums, 
such as ambiguity aversion, loss aversion and risk aversion; even though the authors maintain the 
claim that Cat bonds are uncorrelated with the rest of the market. If risk aversion would be a 
determining factor in Cat bond premiums we would expect the coefficient to be negative and 
significant, but we find no explanatory power by the risk aversion proxy of Cat bond returns in the 
period after the crisis. The results therefore oppose the theoretical explanation made by Bantwal 
& Kunreuther (2000) that level of risk appetite in the market has an effect on investors’ required 
premium for Cat bonds. The level of loss aversion should also be partly reflected in the risk 
aversion proxy because the index is calculated from both very risky assets and less risky assets. 
Other possible biases mentioned by Bantwal & Kunreuther (2000) such as ambiguity aversion due 
to investors’ uncertainty about natural disasters are less likely to be captured by the risk aversion 
proxy and might still have an effect on premiums required.  
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As mentioned earlier, we expect the risk-free rate to be correlated with the Cat bond returns 
because of the pricing structure of Cat bonds. This is not in line with our findings for the post-
crisis period and this can be explained by the low volatility in the risk-free rate after the crisis. The 
rationale of this explanation is that we find a correlation when the volatility is higher (during the 
crisis) but not when the volatility is low (post-crisis).  
 
During the period from 2010 to the first quarter of 2017, the weekly average return of Cat bonds 
is lower than the return of both the equity- and corporate bond market. The mean return of Cat 
bonds is also lower than the return observed during the crisis. Generally, when a market grows and 
matures, it becomes more effective and the returns decline. As described by Wattman & Fieg 
(2008), the Cat bond market has become more standardized: the bonds are rated and the risks are 
now more isolated to the occurrence of natural disasters. These changes in combination with the 
performance during the crisis might be the reason for the increased attractiveness of Cat bonds, 
which we see in the continued growth of the market, and could explain why Cat bond returns are 
lower in the post-crisis period. Looking at the risk-adjusted returns however, we see that Cat bonds 
have outperformed both the stock market and the high yield corporate bond market. This is 
because of the low volatility of Cat bond returns relative to the volatility of stocks and corporate 
bonds. Again, this is the result of the low systematic risk that Cat bonds show after the crisis. The 
low volatility can also be connected to the reduced exogenous- and modelling risks due to 
standardization in the market.  
 
The market after the crisis is known for very low interest rates, a phenomenon widely discussed by 
researchers. Cat bonds have a credit risk but because of their structure, with the floating interest 
rate as a base, the duration risk is low. According to Alloway (2016), this would suggest that 
investors in the low interest rate environment will turn away from Cat bonds and into other assets 
with longer maturity and thereby higher duration risks. This is the opposite of our findings when 
observing the Cat bond market in the low interest environment.  
 
Similar to the crisis period, we find Cat bonds have been valuable assets to investors after the crisis, 
considering their low correlation with other markets. Even though the differences in Sharpe ratios 
are less pronounced during the post-crisis period, Cat bonds have clearly out-perform the stock 
market and the high yield segment of the corporate bond market. 
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5.3 Risk-adjusted return total period 2007-2017 
We examine the total period to see how well Cat bonds have performed in different market 
environments. Observing the results, we find that Cat bonds’ risk-adjusted return has been 
significantly higher than those of stocks and corporate bonds. The mean weekly return has been 
higher and the volatility has been lower in comparison to the other asset classes tested. These clear 
differences can be explained by the fact that Cat bonds were less affected by the crisis. This further 
strengthens the previous inferences that Cat bonds add value to an investor and that this is 
consistent in differing market conditions, even over a longer period of time. 
 
6. Future research 
The methods we have chosen to test the hypotheses is TS regressions and difference of means 
tests. An alternative approach to test if Cat bonds are a good instrument for diversification could 
be to synthesize two different portfolios with only one including Cat bonds and compare the two. 
This method calls for a more detailed dataset with information about individual Cat bonds that we 
do not have access to since Cat bonds are traded OTC. Using indices as proxies, we find the 
method chosen in this thesis more appropriate. If more detailed data would be obtained, the model 
could be developed even further. 
 
Access to more detailed data about Cat bonds would also allow for future researchers to examine 
the different factors that impact Cat bond premiums. Kish (2016) provides input to the research 
by listing risks that might influence the required return and Bantwal & Kunreuther (2000) discuss 
biases that might affect the premiums. Both these papers have a theoretical rather than an empirical 
approach. An interesting empirical approach for future researchers could be to build a model that 
explains the effect of the different risks and biases on Cat bond premiums. 
 
7. Robustness 
7.1 Endogeneity and causality 
The data we have of the Swiss Re Global Cat Bond TR Index does not contain information about 
the liquidity of the bonds traded within the index. This gives rise to a possible omitted variable 
problem, since investors demand higher premiums for illiquid assets. However, considering the 
size of the Cat bond market in comparison with the equity and corporate bond market, the liquidity 
of Cat bonds is unlikely to influence the returns in the other markets and we therefore believe that 
the estimates are unlikely to be biased because of this.  
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In the TS regression models we include a proxy for risk aversion based on an index to reduce 
possible endogeneity issues caused by the level of risk aversion in the market. There are two 
concerns about using this index as a proxy. First, in previous research, Bantwal & Kunreuther 
(2000) discuss the potential effect of other psychological factors such as ambiguity aversion, due 
to the lack of knowledge about Cat bonds and the uncertainty in modelling natural disaster, on Cat 
bond premiums. It is unlikely that the risk aversion proxy captures these imperfections, but since 
they do not directly alter the market returns of stocks and corporate bonds this should not give 
rise to an endogeneity problem. Second, the utility functions of investors are unobservable, which 
makes their risk aversion difficult to quantify and it is difficult to tell how well the index captures 
the true level of risk aversion. If the proxy cannot perfectly track the risk aversion, this still induces 
a possible endogeneity problem. A way of investigating this would be to extend the method with 
models involving different ways of measuring risk appetite.  
 
Throughout this thesis we are interested in finding a correlation between the dependent variable 
and variables of interest and the method chosen does not allow us to make any conclusions about 
causality. Previous research by Wang & Kutan (2013) has shown that natural disasters do not have 
significant impact on the equity market. We do not test this hypothesis or include variables for 
natural disasters in the models and because of this we cannot make any statements about causal 
effects. It is not in our objective to draw conclusions about causality since our main interest is to 
examine the beta of Cat bonds.  
 
In both the regression models for the post-crisis period, the R-squared is approximately 0.06. This 
is not considered as an issue since Cat bond returns mainly are determined by the probability of 
the bond being triggered (i.e. the probability of the disaster occurring) and other Cat bond 
characteristics such as modelling risks and initial costs of education. 
 
7.2 Risk-free rate proxy 
As a proxy for the risk-free rate we use the return of the BofA Merrill Lynch 3-Month U.S. Treasury 
Bill Index, which is based on the three-month U.S. treasury floating rate. For the period of the 
crisis, the results are in line with our expectation that the risk-free rate has an explanatory power 
on Cat bond returns. During this period there is sufficient volatility of the variable. For the period 
after the crisis the volatility of risk-free return is low and this is most likely the explanation to why 
the coefficient of the risk-free rate variable is not significant, which is in contrast to our 
expectations. To check the robustness of the risk-free rate proxy we test if the results differ when 
using the risk-free yield of a different index, US Generic Government 3-month yield (Bloomberg 
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ticker: USGG3M), but get no significance in this case either. We also test if we find a correlation 
when using prices of the BofA Merrill Lynch 3-Month U.S. Treasury Bill Index instead of returns 
but the results are unchanged.  
 
7.3 Sharpe ratio 
One weakness in the Sharpe ratio computations is the simplifying assumption that returns are IID. 
It is highly likely that this assumption is violated by the financial time series we are studying due to 
autocorrelation and volatility clustering. Lo (2002) argues that ignoring these factors can lead to 
estimate errors. Still, this assumption is crucial in order for us to be able to test the significance of 
the results. Using our method, the differences in Sharpe ratios are very substantial, all significant at 
a 0.05% level, suggesting that the results would still hold even if the estimators to some degree are 
biased.  
 
The other assumption we make is that the covariance between the Sharpe ratios is zero. Since we 
find little or no correlation (and consequently little or no covariance) in returns between Cat bonds 
and the other assets, the covariance of Sharpe ratios should not affect the results in a meaningful 
way. In addition, the significant betas we find are positive, meaning that the covariance is positive. 
This would increase the t-statistics, since the variance of the difference of means decreases with 
increased covariance.1 Hence, we can safely make the assumption that there is no covariance 
between the Sharpe ratios.  
 
The excess return of the S&P 500 (the return of the S&P 500 minus the risk-free return) during 
the crisis is negative, making the Sharpe ratio negative. Comparing positive and negative Sharpe 
ratios is somewhat problematic. Consider two different portfolios, A and B, with equal negative 
excess returns. If A has higher standard deviation, it will show a higher (less negative) Sharpe ratio 
and would seem like a more attractive investment. However, choosing between two portfolios with 
equal returns and different standard deviations, the best option is the portfolio with the lowest 
standard deviation, in this case B. In other words, the high volatility of the S&P 500 during the 
crisis increases the Sharpe ratio instead of lowering it. Since the results already allow us to reject 
the null at the 1% significance level, this has no effect on our findings. 
 
 
                                                          
1 Since for dependent variables, Var(X − Y) = Var(X) + Var(Y) − 2Cov(X, Y) 
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8. Conclusion 
Cat bonds offer vital protection to insurance companies by giving them access to reinsurance 
through the capital market. These instruments are often described as zero-beta assets in the 
literature. The rationale behind this is that the state of the economy has no influence on the 
likelihood of a natural disaster and that even large natural disasters have insignificant effect on the 
financial market. Our research demonstrates a significant correlation with the equity- as well as 
high yield corporate bond market during the subprime crisis. Thus, it allows us to disprove that 
Cat bonds are zero-beta instruments in such extreme market conditions. The results we present in 
this thesis indicate that this correlation between Cat bond returns and equity- and corporate bond 
returns partly can be explained by the investors’ risk aversion during a financial crisis - a 
contribution to the behavioral aspect of Cat bond returns previously discussed by researchers but 
never statistically tested.  
 
Nevertheless, supported by the low betas during the crisis, we suggest that Cat bonds still offer a 
relevant source of diversification. In addition to this we argue that improvements made in the Cat 
bond market after the subprime crisis might lower the correlation with the market in case of a 
similar event in the future. When further examining betas after the crisis we find no evidence of 
correlation between Cat bond returns and equity- or high yield corporate bond returns. This 
strengthens the argument that Cat bonds offer diversification to investors. 
 
Moreover, when comparing the performance of the Cat bond market with the equity- and high 
yield corporate bond market by looking at weekly Sharpe ratios, thereby taking into account the 
systematic- as well as the idiosyncratic risk, we find that Cat bonds clearly have out-performed the 
two other asset classes. Cat bonds have a significantly higher risk-adjusted return during the crisis 
and post-crisis period. The high risk-adjusted returns of Cat bonds can be attributed to the low 
systematic risk of these instruments, which made them resilient to the market crash in 2007-2008.  
After the crisis the volatility of Cat bonds remains low, yielding a higher risk-adjusted return than 
those of stocks and high yield corporate bonds. Again, the low volatility can be explained by the 
low systematic risk and the structural improvements made in the Cat bond market.  
 
Analyzing the correlation and risk-adjusted returns over the last 10 years we find some important 
insights of the continuously growing Cat bond market during and after a financial crisis. Not only 
do Cat bonds offer value to the insurance market, but as our research demonstrates, Cat bonds are 
low-beta instruments with high risk-adjusted return that also offer value to investors.  
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